Modes of Inclusion (Democratic): Electoral heroism

The rather erudite and accomplished S. Y. Qureshi, until this past June (2012) the Chief Election Commissioner of India, gave a lecture this week at Berkeley’s Center for South Asia Studies.

The administrative gesture:              S. Y. Qureshi

Dr. Qureshi’s title was “An Undocumented Wonder: Managing the World’s Biggest Elections.” At stake, in other words, was the management of scale.

And, given the apt description of such enormous scale as wondrous, at stake was what is often termed the sublime. Jawaharlal Nehru famously repositioned the sublime in terming massive dams the temples of modern India. Perhaps elections are the new sublime, the dams of neoliberal India.  And yet elections have been a feature of a national aesthetics for a long time. After the talk I had the opportunity to speak with him at some length.

This post is in conversation with Dr. Qureshi’s formal comments during his talk. Though his informal conversation with me was no less critical in pushing my thinking on biometrics and its associated modes of “inclusion,” I will respect the latter’s informality and confidentiality.

Such caution is not usual for me: I have long argued for an expansive practice in which virtually any encounter is–must be–“fieldwork,”a 24/7 anthropology-as-necessarily-poor-boundaries approach. And obviously, even conversations that cannot be directly represented inform the direction of one’s thinking and work. This growing reliance of mine, however, on caution, withholding discussion, and indirection is I think both a feature of power–of working with high-level officials in situations where both I and they are conscious of the stakes in public representation–and of my own growing dependence on the good will of state administrators as I take on greater responsibility for the Center for South Asia Studies and for research access and funding for students and colleagues.

But I do think that much can be done to think with the formal public lecture, preserving both the hospitality and respect one offers to a visiting speaker and the critical engagement, and again respect, one offers to a reader.

Dr. Qureshi’s comments, accompanied by a power point type slide show, began with accounts of what I will call electoral heroism. I neither use the term ironically nor as paean, but descriptively. Qureshi gave two kinds of examples in which the Electoral Commission [hereafter EC] of India, charged at the Central (federal) government level with organizing, managing, and governing the conduct of elections, went to great pains to ensure that every Indian had access to elections:

(1) situations in which parties of EC workers had to undertake arduous journeys, such as treks over snowy Himalayan paths in Ladakh in weather in which air transport was impossible; and

(2) situations in which even in remote and depopulated areas where only a single voter remained, the EC would establish a polling station.

Radical inclusion: Guru Bharatdas Darshandas, the only voter in Banej in a remote area of the Gir Forest, Gujarat

The effect of such accounts was to remind us of the quality and force of Indian democracy and the at times extraordinary efforts needed to maintain its promise to provide an accessible vote to, quite literally, the last man. In a word, inclusion.

Or last woman: I have earlier written in No Aging in India of the ubiquitous appearance, at election times across India, of news photos of old women hobbling or being carried to the election station or standing at the ballot box, peering at it with the weakened and bespectacled vision of old age. In that book I tried to give something of genealogy for this old woman of the polls, her relation to other figures of old women that proliferate in north India and Bengal over the long nineteenth century. But the simplest explanation for her appearance is the most obvious. In India, she promises, even the most frail or socially marginal person has the power to remake governments and to redistribute power. (Conversely, she can of course be taken in the opposite direction: suggesting that the voter has little more power than a socially marginal and ailing old woman.)

The scene of inclusion: our old woman of the polls

Indeed, Dr. Qureshi showed several such photos of old men and women, particularly women.

It is worth reflecting on the old woman of the polls before proceeding further. She reminds us, first, that “inclusion” is not only a particular gesture of these times of individuated, encompassing neoliberal governance. The newspaper editors who created and circulated her (this image from the late 1980s of an old, frail, bespectacled, and Muslim woman is from the Times of India) were participating in a rendering of the nation-state as a radically inclusive order. She is of course a citizen and the image participates in a particularly Indian secular liberalism founded in the citizen as its ground and promise.

Her form will recur with UID/Aadhaar in a different figure of inclusion but again positioned on an old woman’s body, in scenes of the old woman as marginal subject being de-duplicated by having her irises scanned or photo taken or fingerprint data “captured.”

Inclusion in Guntur, Andhra Pradesh: our old woman of the card

With Aadhaar, of course, the “Resident” has replaced the citizen as the subject of inclusion, as I have discussed at some length in this blog.

Perhaps the most interesting feature of the earlier photo of the old woman of the polls is the disembodied spectral hand, evocative of the Beast’s dream palace in Cocteau’s Belle et la Bête, directing the woman’s gaze and ours to the yawning hole where her franchise is to be placed. Inclusion, we are shown, is here a directed process. Who, or what is the agent, the master of inclusion in the dream palace of the nation’s democratic promise?

Here.

Perhaps, as we move from the old woman of the polls to the old woman of the Aadhaar card, this is the wrong question to ask. Again: what concepts, what understanding of politics and “the social,” of ethics and and of maneuver, might be needed as we move from the national subject as a citizenry to the national subject as a database?

Let me return, in the next post, to the lecture by Dr.Qureshi, and to his thoughts on the future of voting and, indeed, on the value of biometrics for the ongoing heroic commitment of the nation to democratic inclusion.

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Marrying into the “banking fold”: Aadhaar, the Euro-chip, and the articulation of variant technologies of trust

More today on the use of Aadhaar to produce “financial inclusion” on the margin. I should note at the outset that the point cannot be only to (re) produce a critique of either financial “exclusion” or “inclusion.”

Proto Indo-European technology

Such critique is obviously important but perhaps difficult to sustain too quickly. In anthropology the broader debate may be to place the powerful critique of poverty capital in relation to the production of an unexpected “neoliberal social.” Barring a change in government, a radical curtailment of UID seems unlikely. UID/Aadhaar will continue to be rolled out.  Barring radical and perceptible failure of the program and its effective politicization, certainly possible, the card and number will attach themselves to the administration of more and more entitlements and institutions. The varied effects of UID will be assessed by many agencies and auditors, including (far down the queue) this researcher. Perhaps more than the current situation, of myriad arguably inflated promises of UID’s biometric design and regulation and myriad arguably premature critiques, the emerging field of audit will be critical to engage: what will constitute an event? An effect?

In anticipation of that work, the blog can only aid in the imagination of a research program and its own forms, sites, and constellations of evidence. Blah blah blah.

Today’s text is again from The Hindu, the edition of August 4, and an article posted from Hyderabad. At stake are security technologies for mobile card-based credit, the widespread European chip technology, or EMV [familiar to North Americans who find that their apparently backward and chipless credit cards often fail them in Europe], versus the biometric guarantee of Universal ID and the Aadhaar card. The first is seen as more secure and a proven technology; the second is much more affordable and would lead to the growth of poverty capital through financial inclusion, and with it the “social” promise of presumptively widespread microcredit.The solution may somehow be to “marry” security and inclusion in the production of a new form of trust-bearing identity and thus to bring in the poor to the formal sector financial “fold” while calming concerns about the trustworthiness of the new technology, its bureaucracy, and its economically marginal beneficiaries. This marriage of techniques and forms would somehow copy the effectiveness of the Euro-chip but bypass its prohibitive cost as banking’s potential seems to lie in producing cheaper norms of inclusion.

Choice is between EMV and Aadhaar: RBI Governor

While the chip and pin is a tested technology, Aadhaar based option is cheaper, says D. Subba Rao

Reserve Bank of India Governor D. Subba Rao has underlined the need for taking a decision on the choice between migrating to EMV (Europay-MasterCard-Visa) with chip and pin and an Aadhaar-based biometric authentication.

The chip and pin is an established and tested technology, but is relatively expensive. The Aadhaar based option is cheaper, but the robustness of the technology is as yet unproven. “If indeed we are finally able to marry Aadhaar into the cards, we will be achieving same level of security available in chip and pin model at a much lower cost,” he said.

Dr. Subba Rao was speaking on the topic “Indian Payment and Settlement Systems: Responsible Innovation and Regulation” at the Institute for Development and Research in Banking Technologies here on Friday. Aadhaar was recognised as an alternate authentication mechanism in payment systems and Aadhaar based payment products had already been designed and introduced.

Aadhaar Enabled Payment Systems was aligned with the UIDAI’s plan to utilise the UID number for routing all the Government benefit transfer payments to beneficiaries. AEPS was a bank-led model allowing online transaction through the business correspondent of the respective bank using the Aadhaar identification.

He said the Aadhaar Payment Bridge System was a centralised electronic benefit transfer facilitating disbursement of benefits to the bank accounts of the beneficiaries linked to their Aadhaar numbers. Such transfer would enable secure and efficient disbursal of benefits to intended beneficiaries which, in turn, help in reducing the administrative costs as well as leakages for the government.

This will also further financial inclusion by bringing the beneficiary households into the banking fold,” he said.

Will this Indo-European marriage make it?

For now, one notes the general form of the proposition: that as banking comes to drive Aadhaar, a form that had earlier if still recently migrated away from a territorialized, village or family-based defense model to a more deterritorialized and neoliberal form tied to a vision of rationalized population mobility and wealth creation, norms of “international” (here European) standard security must somehow be reintroduced. Aadhaar is to be “married” to a more secure technology and form, something like the chip and PIN number bank card but without the cost of the chip. What kind of marriage will be arranged is not yet clear. But if Aadhaar, under the ministry of finance, is perceived by security-focused industries and bureacracies as lacking in security, the idea here is that Aadhaar/UID must be combined with something else, not yet specified by these high-level officials.

Violence at the limits of liberal governance: on claims about Aadhaar as a “vote bank” nexus

The last posts suggested some concerns around Aadhaar and Universal ID in Assam circulate around a second figure of the duplicate—not the cheater whose proliferating instances of identity must be de-duplicated, but the presumptively illegal Bangladeshi migrant whose passing as an Indian citizen may be legitimated if s/he gains access to an Aadhaar card and identity.

Assamese-Bangladesh border

Much of both popular and expert literature on the effects of migration across the Assamese-Bangladeshi border is neither dispassionate nor particularly empirical. A problem is proposed—large scale illegal migration and “land grabbing”—but few local studies helping to specify the stakes either in border districts or large towns and cities are cited. Such studies may exist—these questions are new for me—but an unscientific survey of several dozen policy or news reports through the medium of the Internet has not yet revealed them. What does clearly exist is a language that moves quickly into the specter of a national struggle between the Assamese and the Bangladeshis, a struggle framed both in a language of demographic invasion and cultural genocide and, iteratively, as a struggle over Islamicization and de-Hinduization. Hindutva groups like the VHP [Vishwa Hindu Parishad, see the classic article by Jaffrelot in Dalmia et al] are not surprisingly perhaps well-represented in debates over the disappearance of Assam; but the range of commentary is far broader.

It would be unfortunate if my point was taken as a dismissal of the effects of large-scale migrations. If the tenor of the debate tends toward the inflammatory, framing the migrant through a presumptive psychology of a rapacious “land hunger,” part of the challenge is to understand the conditions of this slippage.

In this context, UID is debated as a means either to establish security and identify the false claims of the migrant, or as a failed enterprise in being conceived not as a register of citizenship but rather residency. Some articles focus on the technical and historical conditions of UID’s database and its complex relation to census instruments, but most focus on the politics of the ruling Congress-Party led alliance as it gears up for elections and courts “vote banks”: here the presumption is that Congress needs the “minority [Muslim] vote” and that its attitude toward UIDAI reflects the contingencies of not seeming too harsh on Muslim migrants.

What emerge are a set of challenges to UIDAI, presumed by articles, reports, and blog posts either to be responses by parties in power to electoral considerations by weakening or attacking UIDAI, or to be responses by parties out of power and especially the Hindu nationalist parties to UID’s claimed role in weakening proof of citizenship and thus weakening state security.

I have elsewhere termed such a political imaginary “the nexus”—in that any position toward an institution, here the UIDAI, is taken to reveal a prior set of “vested interests” benefiting the powers behind a political formation. What is interesting is that rival visions of the impact of migration and of state response may both be organized around a critique of UID /Aadhaar.

Rather than detailed commentary, let me just throw out a brief discussion of and citation from 2 citations that exemplify this range of problematization and the shared critique of UID.

(1) from Shantanu Bhagwat’s blog, Satyameva Jayate: Dedicated to “Bharat” and “Dharma” in a post entitled “This weekend, worrying about Assam”:

Mr. Bhagwat cites another blogger, Nitin, who argues for regularized work-permits as part of “the solution” to the security problem of Bangladeshi migration and who suggests that UID can also be used to keep track of who is a citizen. Nitin frames the program in the longue durée:

“Probably the most important event in (Assam) during the last 25 years — an event, moreover, which seems likely to alter permanently the whole future of Assam and the whole structure of Assamese culture and civilization — has been the invasion of a vast horde of land-hungry Bengali immigrants, mostly Muslims, from the districts of (Bangladesh).”

You might think I am quoting a contemporary BJP leader. These are, in fact, words of C S Mullan, census commissioner under the British Raj. He made these comments in 1931. If you thought that the issue of “illegal immigrants from Bangladesh” is a recent one, then think again.

Demographic change in the erstwhile Assam province in the first half of the twentieth century was at the heart of the Muslim League’s demand, in the 1940s, that the territory be given to Pakistan. So those who argue that large-scale immigration from Bangladesh is one of the biggest long-term threats to India’s national security are right.

Nitin’s move is interesting: he differentiates himself from the Hindu nationalist BJP and grounds his concern rather in the colonial era census. In other words: reason, not passion, should guide a planned response: thus work permits and UID as the solution as opposed to the violent means advocated by some.

His response is dual: use the Bangladeshi project of Universal ID, cross-nationally in collaboration with Bangladesh, to survey and control numbers of migrants. This is the “negative” part of the solution (“You might be surprised to know that as many as 85 million Bangladeshis have biometric National ID Cards (NIDs) which were issued ahead of the 2008 elections. These cards are now required for opening bank accounts, applying for passports and accessing public services”)

And, the positive: use the Indian UID to assess who is really a citizen. Vote-bank politics, by which Nitin like many commentators suggests the Congress Party soft-pedals control of Bangladeshis to garner the needed Muslim vote in its coalition building, have garnered the dividends of Congress (neoliberal, non-Hindu nationalist) Rule. Here Nitin identifies with these dividends, but marks a limit in the figure of the migrant. The security threat of Bangladeshis flooding in must be tackled. But the solution extends the liberal promise of Congress through the rationalized distribution of cross-national labor through cross-national biometrics.

In contrast, Mr. Bhagwat notes that UID is not organized around citizenship rolls and therefore cannot function to address any security issue here.

I am pretty certain he [Nitin] realises that UID is not about citizenship – it is more about establishing an “identity” – and to the best of my knowledge, it is going to be based on the National Population Register. The population register is not the same as a record of citizens (or citizenship) and it would therefore be wrong and misleading to use that as  the basis for establishing citizenship (the fact that this is exactly what is very likely to happen is  a topic for a separate discussion).

Mr. Bhagwat then cites a series of article excerpts by the Assamese journalist Wasbir Hussain, including the following:

As a result of population movement from Bangladesh, the spectre looms large of the indigenous people of Assam being reduced to a minority in their home state… This silent and invidious demographic invasion of Assam may result in the loss of the geo-strategically vital districts of Lower Assam [on the border with Bangladesh]. The influx of these illegal migrants is turning these districts into a Muslim majority region. It will then only be a matter of time when a demand for their merger with Bangladesh may be made…

This concern [staged in Husain’s signifiably Muslim but Indian and Assamese voice, again not in a Hindutva voice] makes Bhagwat wonder if the regularization of work permits is enough. He leaves the alternatives unvoiced.

His lone respondent voices an alternative, a figure of counter-violence. “Seadog” cites the positive example of the Maharashtra based Shiv Sena party and writes:

Watch and hit hard. Don’t slacken off, ever. Boycott them. Track them relentlessly. Recently, with the threat of imminent violence in Assam, a lot of infiltrators fled back to Bangladesh.

They [those who threatened this imminent violence] could take lessons from the Sena, maybe even some help.
Liberty does not come cheap.

Here, a rational-liberal discourse of formalizing illegal/informal migration marks its own limit in the difficulty of keeping population based and citizenship based form of surveillance separate. At that limit, if Seadog can be taken to mark the effects Mr. Bhagwat’s silence both potentiates and elides, calls for extreme violence may proliferate.

(2) In a response to a web post on the 24/7 News channel NDTV’s website, the posting being about growing opposition to UIDAI, one commentator writes:

There are lots of illegal immegrants from pakistan and bangladesh. This comes to many millions, with UID, everyone is going to get legal ID for them. which is very dangeros for the countries security. Question is how to identify them, Indians borders were opened all these years. It is unfortunate. In Assam there were only 2% minorites, today some analysts are mentioning this figure is about 35%, how did this happen?. UPA government is playing Vote bank politics , compromising on counrties security.

Here the presumptive nexus is between the Congress-led UPA government and the [unnameable, within the norms of contemporary Indian political discourse] Muslim “vote bank.” UID becomes the instrument of such pro-Muslim “vote bank politics.”

Behind this claim, however, one might need to ask what other kind of politics exist. There seem to be two kinds of political theory that haunt such a claim and resistance to it.

More recently, there is the much discussed argument of Partha Chatterjee that “most of the world” in its ever burgeoning squatter-settlement global cities inhabits a form of “political society” in which relations with state agencies and other powerful formations must be negotiated by informal, brokered, aggressively collective, often criminalized means (the squatters and illegals need the means to live and thrive and entertain self-respect; what I am calling the powerful formations need to govern the population and its milieu), as opposed to “civil society” with its formals and legal relations to land (ownership and tenancy and taxation) and labor (taxation and regulation) and electoral, individualized politics. Surely the blogs cited above are haunted by the potential collapse of local civil society (but here linked to the racialized imaginary of the nation) and the need either to through the identity card create some intermediate position between the fully formalized and the dangerously proliferating informal migrant, or, through threats of imagined counter-violence, to descend to the presumed level of political society.

But there may be another trajectory, through the sociologist M. N. Srinivas from his 1955 concept of the vote bank and a series of debates on the “demand polity” that emerge in conversation with him. This trajectory may offer other ways to think through UID as it gets pitched as the failed (duplicate?) protector of civil society. This trajectory may not exercise in the same way the presumptive and for me deeply flawed sociology of “India” as a persistently split entity, here between the dualism of political and civil society.

Tripura, the opposite of Assam: on “success” in universal identification

This week’s focus, thanks to Malini Sur, is the Northeast: next week’s, thanks to Tulasi Srinivas, will be the question of failure haunting the publicity of UID since late 2011. Today’s and tomorrow’s posts bridge these. Tripura is positioned very differently in the Indian Northeast, in relation both to Bangladesh and to relations to Bengal more generally, than Assam, subject of the last 2 posts. This difference is something that at the moment I can discuss only anecdotally, and I would appreciate appropriate guidance. But in brief, Tripura has become one of the great success stories of UIDAI, if success is measured in the saturation of identity card registration. If Assam, as we saw, fears a double erasure–absent to national counts, and swamped by Bangladeshi migrants–Tripura is among the most present, counted, places in the Indian Union.

Tripura (in red) in India, Wikimedia Commons location map

Tripura leads in UID enrolment

Sep 26, 2011

UID

Tripura leads in enrolments for the the ambitious “Aadhaar” scheme, a 12-digit number being issued by the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) for all Indian residents, a minister said here Monday.

“In Tripura, 80 percent of the 3.7 million population have so far been enrolled in Aadhaar scheme followed by Andhra Pradesh (25 percent) and Maharashtra (20 percent),” Tripura Rural Development Minister Jitendra Choudhury told reporters.

Quoting a communique of the union rural development ministry, Choudhury said : “The central government, at a function in New Delhi on Thursday, would give awards to Tripura and other well performing states in implementation of the Aadhaar scheme.” Tripura was the first state in the northeast and the eighth in India where the Aadhaar scheme was launched on Dec 2 last year.

According to UIDAI director general and mission director Ram Sevak Sharma, in the next four years, 60 crore Indians would get the Aadhaar number. “Crores [tens of millions] of Indians do not have bank accounts. Once they get the Aadhaar number it would easily facilitate them to open a bank account and get banking services,” Sharma had told reporters here recently. The Aadhaar scheme, formally launched by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Sep 29 last year, is now in progress in many states. UIDAI has empanelled several enrolment agencies across the country.

“The Aadhaar number is an official confirmation of residency not the citizenship of any individual,” an official of the Tripura government clarified.

“The quality and speed of lots of government programmes and issue of official documents to people would be improved through this Aadhaar number,” he said, adding that the problems in getting government facilities and services would also be reduced. According to the official, the Aadhaar number would be stored in a centralised database and linked to the basic demographics and biometric information, including a person’s photographs, 10 fingerprints and iris impression. “The Aadhaar number and all details of an individual will be easily verifiable in an online and cost-effective way,” he added. “By March next year, the enrolment of all residents of Tripura would be completed. They would then get the Aadhaar number directly from UIDAI,” said the official.

Three things:

1) the “well-performing state”: Tripura, anthropomorphized, is to receive an award. Again, the index at stake seems to be one of “forwardness,” tied simultaneously to a developmental figure of command-polity effectiveness and (perhaps) a post-developmental figure of entrepreneurial efficiency. [If in the last post I posited two variably distributed and interrelating governmental regimes, developmental and neoliberal, I should note up front that such is an unsatisfactory conceptualization and will require work as I learn more]. But “performance,” not to make too strong a point where one is unwarranted, may pull us in some other directions. For now: what is developmentalism today? For whom does it perform? Here the figure is of a provincial entity performing its effectiveness for the Centre, a complex claim on the cosmopolitan as well as as the forward and modern.

2) not citizenship but residency: here, quite explicitly, is the claim that UID cannot stand for citizenship, even as UID is iteratively linked to (future) entitlement, within all the voluminous promise of the Kshirsagar [milk-ocean] of entitlement that will flow consequent upon mass de-duplication. Narrowly, the difference from Assam (if these contrastive articles I have posted can be used to entertain broader claims) is striking. The duplicate-migrant is not a palpable figure, at least not here. Tripura unlike Assam has not “disappeared.” On the contrary, it is an award-winning figure of presence and vitality, among the most counted polities in the nation. Understanding and disentangling the distinction here will take me some time, and again, help would be appreciated.

the future of entitlement?

Beyond the specific Northeast story, the claim of UID as a non-citizenship marker, and the question then of exactly what is Residency (a good old word redolent with colonial significance, not the least of which is the lurid literature of the Indian “Mutiny” and the fate of white Lucknow, if perhaps of dubious relevance here) looms. One way to think residency through will be to look, as Ashveer Singh has pointed out in a comment, at the NRI [Non-Resident Indian] as an included figure under Aadhaar: here, at first glance, UID seems to be offered in the opposite way: to citizens (some NRIs can now make such claims, in a way of relevance to my colleague Aihwa Ong’s classic work on flexible citizenship) but not to residents. So how the two are variably assembled seems a critical if obvious question.

3) Tripura as a figure of totality: Tripura promises to be the first “totally” counted state, and as such may stand as the elusive “Proof of Concept” [a bureaucratic term of self-audit that UIDAI has long used to argue for its commitment to effectiveness] that UIDAI has sought. The Central administration’s relation to Tripura is ritually elaborated: thus, the millionth person deemed to be a registrant for UID was from Tripura, a celebrated fact.